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Conventional wisdom instructs that class actions, which vest control of
litigation involving many class members in the hands of a few class representa-
tives, interfere with the exercise of an individual's right to direct her own
lawsuit. Class action proponents and opponents alike accept this dogma when
they assume that the only defense of group litigation is that its varied benefits
outweigh the harms attendant to a loss of individual control over litigation.1
In contrast, this Note argues that the traditional characterization of individualism
is inappropriate in the class action context. The important individual interests
implicated by group litigation recommend a revision of Rule 23's "opt out"
provision so as to make it available to all class members contingent upon a
good cause showing.2
1. Two examples relying on very different assessments of class action benefits are the majority opinion
in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,808 (1985) (class action "was an invention of equity" allowing
"suits where the number of those interested in the litigation was too great to permit joinder"), and Justice
Douglas' observation that "a class action serves not only the convenience of the parties but also prompt,
efficient judicial administration. I think in our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to be
innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures who would go begging for justice without
the class action but who could with all regard to due process be protected by it." Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
2. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes and describes class action suits. Rule
23(a) establishes four prerequisites to maintaining a class action: that the number of people in the class be
too numerous to permit ordinary joinder, that members of the class share common questions of law or fact;
that the "claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class";
and that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Crv.
P. 23(a). Once the demands of section (a) are satisfied, the party requesting class certification must
demonstrate compliance with one of the three subdivisions found in section (b). Eisen, 417 U.S. at 163.
Litigants may maintain suits under sections b(1) and b(2) where separate actions might result in judgments
subjecting the party opposing the class to inconsistent standards of conduct, resulting either from conflicting
injunctions or from an inability to satisfy all claimants when money damages are at issue. See Amendments
to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100-02 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Notes). In contrast,
subdivision b(3) is available where group litigation predominantly seeking money damages would be
"convenient and desirable" and where questions "common to the class predominate over the questions
affecting individual members." Id. at 102-03. Primarily, however, this Note is concerned with the provision,
unique to suits brought under subdivision b(3), which instructs:
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Any abstract argument about "individual interests" is worthy of exposition
not for its own sake, but because it could have real consequences for real
litigants. After all, the fundamentally important interests at stake in any litiga-
tion are defined by the substance of the dispute-egregious deprivation of civil
rights at the hand of the state, frustrated expectations owing to a broken
contract, financial tragedy wreaked by an unfaithful fiduciary, grievous and
painful bodily injury inflicted by an unsafe product. Nevertheless, implicit in
this Note is a belief that debates over the nature of individualism are not merely
academic, for those debates produce rules that regulate the opportunities for
redress available within our legal system. Theory and doctrine are of little
immediate comfort to an ailing victim, but by defining who is entitled, and how
people are entitled, to seek legal redress for injury, they work a certain magic:
they turn victims into plaintiffs.
While this Note engages the class action primarily in theoretical terms, it
also endeavors to discover practical deficiencies in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23's opt out provision. Accordingly, Part I of this Note identifies two
possible characterizations of individualism and (the lack of) constitutional
guidance in choosing to valorize one over the other. Looking more to how the
class device functions in practice, Part II focuses primarily on two of the actors
involved in any class suit in order to determine whose conception of individual-
ism deserves priority. Part III reformulates Rule 23's opt out provision and
measures the reformed rule against our aspirations regarding class litigation.
I. WHAT INDIVIDUALISM?
Meaningful discussion about the character of individualism can only proceed
from a clear understanding of what one means when one invokes the term. At
first glance, opting out of a suit controlled by others seems to be a paradigmatic
example of individualism from which one could derive a convincing definition.
Rule 23(c)(2) seems to allow an individual litigant, in the name of individual-
ism, to say to the class representative, "Litigate your interests, not mine.' 3 That
definition becomes less convincing, however, if other litigants can make
competing claims sounding in the language of individualism, claims based on
(A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified
date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter
an appearance through counsel.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Those who do not elect to leave the suit will find that the doctrine of res judicata
binds them to the judgment concerning the class, be it favorable or unfavorable, just as if they had been
parties to any individual action. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4455, at 471-73 (1981); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-43 (1940).
3. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, No. 88-4997, 1990 WL 125702, 35-37 (N.D. 111.) ("[Tihe idea that
someone may be bound by the results of a case even though he did not participate is in tension with the
autonomy recognized by our legal system ... [but] [cilass actions do not offend accepted [autonomy]
principles in the same way" because class members can opt out.).
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their need for an effective mechanism by which to vindicate their rights. The
task, then, is to sort out the various individualist concerns that necessarily come
into play when various litigants simultaneously seek to go to court. More
specifically, how well does the vision of individual control of suits, which is
embodied in opting out, match up with litigation controlled by groups?
In fact, both the statutory arrangement that allows unregulated opting out
and the theory behind it appear to be flatly inconsistent with the innovation of
group litigation, namely that similarity of interest among class members allows
one individual to represent another when litigating over common interests.4
This apparent inconsistency in the Federal Rules reflects a certain ambivalence
about allowing, in every class suit, representation of an individual by a class
without that individual's consent. Thus, Rule 23(c)(2) makes opting out avail-
able only to members of classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), classes which
the Rules assume to be less cohesive than those certified under either Rule
23(b)(1) or (b)(2) in that they include some class members whose interests
diverge from those held by the class representatives. 5
Proceeding from this assumption, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not test for similarity or difference of interest on a case-by-case basis. Rather,
the Rules treat the b(1)/b(2)/b(3) classification scheme as a proxy for making
judgments about cohesiveness, categorically concluding that b(3) classes are
generally less cohesive than b(1) or b(2) classes. Because the b(3) class is
ostensibly less cohesive, individual litigants are permitted to pursue their
divergent claims by exiting the class suit.
Of course, if the interests of the opter out and the class representative were
fundamentally different, resolution of the class suit would not interfere with the
ability of an individual litigant independently to vindicate her claim; the class
and the individual suits simply would not speak to one another. Consequently,
the Rules actually protect a weaker and more ambiguous admonition than that
previously identified, namely, "Litigate your interests, not mine, although our
interests overlap in part." Insofar as b(3) classes are concerned, the Federal
4. Compare the holding in Mulane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306,313 (1950), that
"the individual interest.., is identical with that of the class" with the Advisory Committee's comment on
Rule 23(c)(2): "[T]he interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigations may be so strong here
as to warrant denial of a class action altogether Even when a class action is maintained under subdivision
(b)(3), this individual interest is respected. Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 2, at
104-05 (emphasis added). See also Dubin v. Miller, No. 85-2184, 1990 WL 126266, 35 (D. Colo.)
("rationale behind the requirement that the class representative's claims be typical of the class claims is
recognition that a plaintiff with claims typical of the class will, in pursuing and defending his own self
interest in the litigation, be concomitantly advancing or defending the interests of the class").
5. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356,390 (1967); see also Walsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 726
F.2d 956, 963 (3d Cir. 1983) ((b)(3) classes less cohesive than those certified under b(l) or b(2)); Holmes
v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); Barefield v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,
12 Fed R. Serv. 3d 1232, 1237-39 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Unlike b(3) actions, the "trademark of the b(2) action
is homogeneity. It is this characteristic that allows the court to ... bind all members to any judgment on
the merits without an opportunity to opt out").
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Rules allow identifiable differences in interest to trump identifiable similarities.
This systematic, categorical presumption in favor of differences reflects the
traditional litany encouraging group litigation only as long as it does not intrude
on an individual's ability to vindicate her rights in court. If, however, opting
out impedes the ability of class members to vindicate their rights, then on what
basis can we justify this systematic presumption in favor of opting out? Why
does the individual's interest have priority?
Such prioritization turns on nothing more and, importantly, nothing less than
the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his [sic] own day
in court."' 6 But this bedrock principle admits of two interpretations: that "every-
one should have his own day in court," or that "everyone should have his own
day in court." The very availability of class actions is an expression of the
former interpretation. Such a conception might be termed the equal access
principle, as it ensures that legally unsophisticated people are not denied a day
in court. Attaining equal access, however, requires that sometimes the desires
or interests of individual class members be constrained in favor of collective
interests. In contrast, the particular opt out provision currently ensconced in
Rule 23 valorizes what might be characterized as the open access principle
insofar as it embraces unconstrained individualism. This provision, vhich
permits each and every putative class member to control his own suit, for any
reason, or for no reason at all, promotes society's desire that everyone should
have "his own" day in court.
Recognition of the fact that we may select between two characterizations
of individualism does not, however, provide guidance as to how to select one
over the other. Unfortunately, neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court
lend much assistance. One might expect the Supreme Court, particularly the
current Supreme Court, to adopt the open access principle without reservation.7
Surprisingly, however, the Court has recently hesitated in its embrace of
unconstrained individualism. In Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,8 the Court held
that "due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided
with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and return-
ing an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form." 9 While Shutts might be read
as affirming the ideal of unconstrained individualism, such an interpretation
would be superficial.
A more nuanced reading of Shutts reveals three ways in which the Court
rejected unconstrained individualism. First, the Court did not labor over its
summary conclusion, leaving unclear the scope of the right to excuse oneself
6. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (1989) (quoting 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417 (1981)).
7. Cf. Martin v. Wflks, 109 S. Ct. at 2180 (holding that, in the absence of privity, consent decree did
not bind those who were not parties when the consent decree was negotiated and agreed to).
8. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
9. Id. at 812.
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from a class. This failing is particularly significant when viewed against a
statutory and doctrinal background that also fails to define the right with any
precision. For example, Rule 23 by its own terms fails to specify the method
of exclusion. 10 Indeed, the constitutional and philosophical underpinnings of
the right to opt out are so ambiguous that before Shutts lower courts divided
over whether any such constitutional right even existed."
Second, in Shutts, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that due
process required putative class members to assent affirmatively to a class suit
by "opting in,"12 the method by which class joinder had been accomplished
prior to the 1966 revision of the Federal Rules. 13 Clearly, an opt in rule reso-
nates more strongly with the principle of unconstrained individualism than does
even a liberal opt out rule, because under an opt in rule, no potential class
member may be bound to the results of a class suit until she actually joins the
class. One might argue that the Court's reluctance to return to the pre-1966 opt
in regime is attributable to the Court's desire to respect the explicit language
and purposes of the 1966 rule reform. The simple reply to this argument is that
Rule 23 is, at best, a statute, 4 whereas Shutts was in relevant part a decision
explicitly based on constitutional due process. Reading the Constitution in light
of a statute would, of course, imply inversion of our constitutional system.
The third piece of evidence demonstrating that Shutts did not affirm uncon-
strained individualism is that the Court explicitly left intact15 the Federal
Rules' failure to provide for any mandatory opt out right in actions maintained
under subdivisions b(l) or b(2).'6 Class plaintiffs in these suits have no oppor-
tunity to assert individual claims as a matter of right, suggesting that the Court
recognized instances in which unconstrained individualism would not allow
unconditional exit from a class suit. Of course, the Court's refusal to consider
whether the same right to opt out afforded b(3) class members should also be
available to b(l) and b(2) class members might reasonably be ascribed to the
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
11. Compare Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1981) (opportunity
to opt out is statutory, not constitutional) and Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 556 F.2d 682, 685-86
(2d Cir. 1977) (denial of opportunity to opt out does not violate constitutional due process) with DeGier
v. McDonald's Corp., 76 F.R.D. 125, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (right to opt out of b(2) class protected by both
due process and equal protection clauses).
12. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12.
13. Prior to 1966, b(3)-type classes were created by putative class members affirmatively opting in.
See Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.RLD. 39, 44-46 (1967).
14. Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 the Supreme Court "shall have the power to prescribe
... general rules of practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals... in civil actions."
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). In fact, the Rules are written and rewritten by a standing committee-the Advisory
Committee-of the Judicial Conference of the United States which forwards its "recommendations" to the
Supreme Court and, in turn, to Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988); see also, 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001, at 6 (1987). Thus I describe the Rules as statutory.
15. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3.
16. Rule 23(c)(2) is limited to actions "maintained under subdivision b(3)." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
A court, in its discretion, may order class representatives to afford putative class members the option of
leaving the suit. See Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F2d 1144, 1152-55 (11th Cir. 1983).
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constitutional and prudential admonition that judges should avoid deciding
issues not implicated in the immediate case.17 The plaintiff class in Shutts was,
after all, certified under the Kansas equivalent of 23(b)(3), not b(1) or b(2).
Still, one might wonder why, given the Court's failure to identify any limits
on the principle implicit in opting out, the Shutts majority went out of its way
specifically to cordon off b(l) and b(2) classes. Possibly, the justices foresaw
the ultimate reach of an open access principle, and they blinked.
Similarly, the rest of the federal bench does not wholeheartedly support the
open access principle in the class action context. Prior to Shutts, lower federal
courts had not only refused to recognize unconstrained individualism as a
constitutional right,"8 but they had also affirmatively sought to avoid providing
opt out rights by systematically preferring to certify classes under Rule 23 b(l)
or b(2) rather than under b(3).19
Unconstrained individualism possesses no theoretical or doctrinal monopoly
over the class action. Even in the wake of Shutts, there exists latitude to define
the theoretical interests at stake in group litigation, and to adjust the require-
ments for opting out so that the practice better serves those interests.
II. WHOSE INDIVIDUALISM?
Although discussing individualism in the class action context most readily
calls to mind the plight of the opter out, in fact those litigants satisfied with
class membership also hold claim to an individualist interest. The difficulty is
that these characterizations of individualism-the unconstrained variety ad-
vanced by the opter out and the constrained variety asserted by class mem-
bers-conflict with one another. As currently written, Rule 23 mistakenly tries
to promote unconstrained individualism even in circumstances in which such
individualism is unworkable or improper. Before examining the ways in which
statutory expression of unconstrained individualism frustrates the ability of class
members effectively to vindicate their rights by means of group litigation, and
thus is improper, we should observe the ways in which opting out fails to
deliver on its promise to protect individual litigants, and thus may be deemed
unworkable.
17. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which
it is to be applied") (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885)).
18. See supra note 11.
19. See Weiner, The Class Action, the Federal Court and the Upper Class: Is Notice, and its Conse-
quent Cost, Really Necessary?, 22 CAI. WESTERN L. REV. 31, 80-86 (1985); see, e.g., Stoetzner v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1325, 1330 (3d Cir. 1990); First Federal of Michigan v. Barrow, 878 F.2d
912, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1989); Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 284 (8th Cir. 1978);
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 556 F.2d 682,685 (2d Cir. 1977); Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n,




A. Class Members Who Choose to Opt Out: Unconstrained Individualists
In practice, opting out fails to fulfill the promise of the open access princi-
ple supported by unconstrained individualists. As currently formulated, a
substantial segment of Rule 23's intended beneficiaries do not enjoy the
advantages of the self-exclusion device.
Rule 23's history helps to identify that segment of the class action popula-
tion to which Rule 23(c)(2) does not speak. Between 1938 and 1966 individuals
could only join class suits now categorized as b(3) actions by affirmatively
opting in to the suit, thereby voluntarily consenting to be bound.20 A principal
reason for doing away with the opt in mechanism was that, as a practical
matter, many who qualified as class members would "for one reason or another,
ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or legal matters .... simply not
take the affirmative step" of sending to the court a request for class member-
ship.21 The dilemma lies in the fact that these "small people,"'  for whom
the more coercive opt out procedure was adopted, remain "unfamiliar[] with
business or legal matters" long after the 1966 modification of Rule 23. Conse-
quently, one wonders just what the average class member makes of the notice
he receives informing him of the pendency of an action and of the opportunity
to opt out.23
Speculation about the meaningfulness of class notice, however, is unneces-
sary. Confusion on the part of class members over the implications of, and
methods for, opting out of a class suit is evident in cases in which courts have
considered the validity of contested requests for exclusion.2 Mashburn v.
National Healthcare is illustrative in this regard.s5 There, an Alabama district
court allowed the plaintiff class' attorney to contact putative class members who
had requested exclusion. That inquiry led the court to conclude that "all of the
persons requesting exclusion [that] plaintiffs' counsel have been able to contact
did so only by mistake due to the similarity of that form and the proof of claim
form."' The limited statistical evidence available suggests that the sort of
ignorance among class members uncovered by the Mashburn court, while
20. See Frankel, supra note 13, at 44-46.
21. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 397-98.
22. Id.
23. See Kennedy, Class Actions: TheRight to Opt Out, 25 ARZ. L. REV. 3,72 (1983) (many b(3) class
members are not large institutional players, and thus have limited litigating experience). For examples of
notice and opt out forms, using confusing and intimidating (although accurate) language, see Simmons v.
City of Kansas City, No. 88-2603, 1990 WL 58710 (D.C. Kan.) (notice ofpendency of action, opt out form,
and claim form), and see generally American Bar Association, Antitrust Section of the Civil Practice and
Procedure Committee, Manual of Class Action Notice Forms (1979) (notice of pendency of action forms
and opt out forms universally using legalistic terms).
24. See, e.g., Valente v. Pepsico, 89 F.R.D. 352 (D. Del. 1981); Perry v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 88 F.R.D.
221 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
25. 684 F. Supp. 660 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
26. Id. at 667.
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certainly not present in all class suits, is typical.' Moreover, in some instances
opters out, typically at the behest of an attorney working on contingency, select
exclusion as a bargaining tool against the rest of the class.2 No doubt, there
are many putative class members who have distinct claims for relief, but are
fearful of dilution or prejudice of the strength of their individual claims by
aggregation with claims common to the class; these members opt out for valid
reasons. However, we should not continue uncritically to sanction often unin-
formed opting out as an exalted expression of individual liberty. To the extent
that we sate our hunger to protect individual rights by this inadequate arrange-
ment, we lack ambition. Promoting unconstrained individualism in group
litigation by means of opting out has failed on its own terms-it does not
protect meaningful open access.
B. Class Members Who Choose to Remain in the Class: Constrained
Individualists
To the extent that Rule 23 permits opting out on suspect or illegitimate
grounds, it frustrates the ability of class members who are satisfied with group
litigation-that is, those who wish to be bound by the outcome of the class
suit-to obtain legal redress. As currently structured, opting out provides
incentives which mute Rule 23's expression of the equal access principle.
Significantly, these incentives did not poison the doctrinal climate when the
Advisory Committee revised Rule 23 in 1966. Instead, the Committee largely
occupied itself with preventing individual litigants who satisfied the requisites
of class membership from intervening after a favorable judgment, thus employ-
ing the results of the class suit to further their own interests. Such
"post-judgment one way intervention" was criticized for lacking "mutuality";
intervening plaintiffs could benefit from an agreeable judicial decision won by
the litigation efforts of the class while at the same time, by virtue of having
avoided joining the action as a party, conveniently sidestepping the res judicata
implications of a ruling in favor of the defendant. This created disincentives
to filing group actions.29 The reformers of 1966 hoped to cure this malady by
replacing statutory authorization to join a class suit in its latest stages with a
rule forcing a choice, either to cast one's lot with the class or to opt out and
go it alone, early on in the litigation. 0
27. Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J 1123, 1149-50 (1974)
(finding that many class members were "uneducated, unknowledgeable, or fearful").
28. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. Cm L. REv. 877, 911 (1987) (opting out often used to secure higher contingent
fees for attorneys); Weiner, supra, note 19, at 97-99 (opting out caters to atypical litigants who manipulate
the process for exacting undeservedly high awards).




In 1966, the framers of the Rule had every reason to take the mutuality
principle for granted. Subsequent and unanticipated Supreme Court decisions
curbing estoppel doctrine's mutuality requirement,3' however, "washed away
the foundation on which the edifice of Rule 23 had been built."32 In the wake
of these decisions, most notably Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, a class member
can excuse himself from a class suit and wait on the sidelines for a final
decision on the merits. Notwithstanding ParkIane's admonition to the contrary,
if the judgment in the class action is favorable to the class, the self-excluded
class member can assert nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel and secure a
judgment against the defendant without any effort, expense, or risk.33 If, on
the other hand, the resolution of the class suit is unfavorable to the class, the
individual litigant can bring a separate action, as he would not be bound by the
previous suit.3
Scholars have noted this free rider problem and its consequent unfairness,
both to the members of the class and to their attorneys, who disproportionately
bear all of the risks and most of the costs of the litigation.35 Given the widely
accepted fact that any one person's monetary recovery (where available) is
often greater in individual than in group actions,36 even good-hearted and
civic-minded class members have economic incentives to opt out and allow
someone else to bring the suit, waiting to capitalize on risk-free benefitsY
31. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) ("preferable approach... is not to
preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when
it should be applied"); Blonder-Tongue Lab v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(overruling uncritical acceptance of the principle of mutuality of estoppel).
32. Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 362 (7th Cir. 1987).
33. Some courts have acted to curb this practice, using their discretion to deny application of the
Parklane doctrine in class suits. Compare Premier Elec., 814 F.2d at 364-67 (adopting "categorical rule"
against employment of estoppel by those who opt out of class suits) and cases cited therein and Vas-Cath
Inc. v. Mahurkar, No. 88-4997, 1990 WL 125702, 37 (N.D. Ill.) (opter out "is not bound by an adverse
judgment in the main action-and correspondingly may not take the benefit of a favorable one") with
Saunders v. Naval Air Rework Facility, 608 E2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1979) (class member opting out of
damages portion of suit may use decision on liability as preclusive); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D.
283, 305-06 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (limitation on collateral estoppel effect is "beyond the power of the certifying
court').
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (class action judgment binds only those who "do not request
exclusion").
35. See Kennedy, supra note 23; Ratliff, Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel and the Option
Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1988); Weiner, supra note 19; Note, Offensive Collateral Estoppel by Persons
Opting Out of a Class Action, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 1189 (1980).
36. Coffee, supra note 28, at 915; Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55
F.R.D. 375, 390 (1973).
37. There is a widespread popular belief that much of the frustration over class action litigation is
attributable to attorneys working on a contingency basis. See, e.g., The Bitter Fight Over the Manville Trust,
N.Y. Tunes, July 8, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 2; id. § 3, at 6, cols. 4-5 (partly attributing near bankruptcy of
settlement fund in complex asbestos class action to substantial attorneys' fees and attorneys' push to secure
higher payments for plaintiffs first in line to collect from the trust). I conflate the role of attorneys and their
clients for two reasons. First, the scope of this Note does not permit satisfactory discussion of theoretical,
practical, and ethical implications of an attorney's role in a class action suit. Second, I am interested in
identifying legitimate independent interests. In an ideal world, attorneys act merely as the agents for opters
out or class members, and thus they have no unique interests. That lawyers often seem in fact to act in their
own individual interests merely accentuates the destructive economic incentives mentioned in the text. For
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This economic incentive, taken to its logical extreme, would deplete the ranks
of class membership to the point where the "numerosity" necessary to maintain
a class action in the first place38 would simply vanish. In its more realistic and
less radical manifestation, the threat to employ the shield of opting out in
combination with the sword of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel allows
individual attorneys to exact unearned concessions from the appointed class
counsel, essentially creating conflicts within the class where none previously
existed.
39
The corollary to waiting for a judgment is the practice of opting out and
"racing to the court." An individual litigant may choose to opt out of the class
and seek a judgment against the defendant before, rather than after, the class
suit comes to fruition, hoping to reap an enormous personal windfall at the
expense of the class."
Both practices prejudice the class. By allowing sophisticated litigants to
manipulate the direction and benefits of a class suit these practices impede the
ability of class members to invoke the equal access principle. Unconstrained
opting out in a post-Parklane world also injures the class in a less obvious way:
it reduces opportunities for settlement.
While class members may desire settlement even if some of their number
leave the suit, the defendant 1 should grow increasingly reluctant to reach
agreement with the class as more litigants opt out. Class actions benefit defen-
dants to the extent that they are procedurally fair"2 and consolidate similar
claims held simultaneously by numerous litigants, allowing for convenient
disposition of cases. The mutuality requirement's demise,43 however, lessened
a comprehensive treatment of this issue, see Coffee, supra note 28, at 877.
38. FED. P CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
39. Davies v. Continental Bank, Nos. 86-6508, 86-7516, 1989 WL 63235 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1989),
presents one such example. There, counsel for opt out plaintiffs requested fees from the settlement fund
on the argument that they made settlement possible by "intense[ly]" negotiating between their clients and
the rest of the class. The court refused to award the fees because the "conflict created by the opting out
[plaintiffs] ... led to what the parties have referred to as intense negotiations." The court reasoned, "Simply
because petitioners [sic] representation of their clients was able to be accomplished without the [opters out]
releasing a guillotine on the heads of the Class does not mean that their actions provided a 'substantial
benefit' to the class members... ." Id. at 9-10; see also, Coffee, supra note 28, at 911. This problem is
exacerbated when courts consolidate individual suits brought by opters out along with the class action,
effectively elevating the bargaining position of the individual litigants relative to the class counsel See, e.g.,
AJ. Canfield Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., No. 88-9810, 1989 WL 99756 (N.D. IIl. Aug. 23, 1989) (consoli-
dated for pretrail proceedings).
40. Coffee, supra note 28, at 910. If the individual litigant triumphs, either through settlement or a final
decision on the merits, that person may earn so much in actual damages that the defendant will be judgment
proof by the time the class action is adjudicated. To reduce such incentives, some commentators have urged
adoption of rules denying opters out access to any punitive damages. See id. at 925-30; Putz, Punitive
Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out. Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1981).
41. While Rule 23 permits certification of defendant classes, most often plaintiffs seek class status.
For this reason, and because plaintiff and defendant classes are treated differently, Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811
n.3, I employ the terms "defendanf' and "party opposing the class" interchangeably.
42. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 390 (articulating sensitivity to preserving "procedural safeguards ... for
the opposing party").
43. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 100: 745
Class Actions
one deterrent to opting out, namely that opters out would face high litigation
costs if they were to file individual suits. 4 Without this deterrent, defendants
face two disturbing prospects: higher overall payments and having to defend
against more suits.
First, opting out with the prospect of bringing a subsequent individual suit
exposes the defendant to multiple judgments, filed virtually cost free by former
class members. If we assume that both class suits and individual suits perfectly
compensate victims, then this prospect of multiple judgments should not
concern us because a defendant will pay out the same aggregate amount under
either a regime favoring class actions or one favoring individual suits. For
example, in the world of perfect compensation, the defendant should be indif-
ferent between a judgment requiring that she pay $1,000,000 to 100 class
members and a judgment requiring that she pay $980,000 to 98 class members
and $10,000 each to 2 individual litigants. Recall, however, the litigation
dynamic that individual suits yield higher per-person damage awards than class
actions.45 In practice, the overall cost to the defendant of paying out the result-
ing awards to opters out can be expected to increase.
Even if the Parklane-created incentives were absent, to the extent that class
members leave the class suit, defendants will be hesitant about entering into
a settlement with a plaintiff class. Opting out threatens a defendant with
numerous suits based on similar, or even identical, factual and legal claims.
Defendants, of course, agree to settle in the hope of disposing of claims against
them with finality and at a lower cost than a full trial entails. Therefore, each
opter out presents the risk of further litigation, or at least of heightened transac-
tion costs in arriving at so many bilateral settlement agreements, exactly the
situation which the defendant sought to avoid.46
Finally, an increase in suits drains scarce judicial resources. This "secondary
goal of judicial efficiency," 47 although only tangentially related to the conflict
between the divergent individualist interests involved in the opt out controversy,
deserves brief comment. A widely perceived benefit of group litigation is its
44. See Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 365-66 (7th Ci.
1987) (but for Parklane doctrine, multiple suits would not arise because of litigating cost to opters out).
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46. The Seventh Circuit explained,
If defendants anticipate significant opting out, they also will reduce the amounts they offer in
settlement, which may in turn make it worthwhile for more parties to opt out. The more attractive
it is to opt out.., the fewer settlements there will be, the less the settlements will produce for
the class, and the more cases courts must adjudicate. This is not judicial economy at work
Premier Elec., 814 F.2d at 366. See also Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1153, 1160 (11th
Cir. 1983) (allowing opt out privileges in particular b(2) suit although maintaining "general rule" that opting
out is to be avoided because of its corrosive effect on settlements); Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,
635 F.2d 501,507 (5th Cit 1981) (refusing to allow opt out privileges in b(2) suit because opting out would
"discourage settlements"); In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 63 F.R.D. 422, 429 (W.D. Okla. 1974)
("Defendants will be loath to offer substantial sums of money in compromise settlement of class actions
unless they can rely on ... Rule 23 to bind class members.").
47. Frankel, supra note 13, at 46.
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ability to achieve "economies of time, effort, and expense ' s by combining
similar claims into a single suit.49 While procedures that reduce settlement
opportunities are inconsistent with judicial preference for settlement,50 we
should not take this argument too far. The greatest cost savings would accrue
to a court that simply refused to recognize any group litigation, assuming that
erstwhile class members with small claims would not access the courts at all
in the absence of the class device 1 Fortunately, however, courts exist first
and foremost to define rights and duties and to fashion remedies for wrongs;
therefore, minimizing costs must always remain a secondary goal.
The failure of unconstrained individualism, as embodied in Rule 23's opt
out provision, to protect the rights of legally unsophisticated class members,
its frustration of the equal access ideal on which the class action is fundamen-
tally predicated, and the added administrative expense that it generates, pose
a challenge: can we recast opting out such that it lives up to our varied aspira-
tions for group litigation without unduly compromising important individual
rights cherished in and inscribed upon the American legal system?
III. A GOOD CAUSE SHOWING PRIOR TO OPTING OUT
One way to begin recasting the class action is by purging it of excessive
deference to unconstrained individualism. While no one doubts that control over
one's own litigative destiny is a deeply valued right, an open access principle
is, by and large, inappropriate in the class action context.
To appropriately confine the open access principle of group litigation, this
Note proposes adding a good cause requirement to Rule 23(c)(2). Such a
requirement would limit a class member's ability to opt out of a class suit to
those instances in which he could demonstrate that the class will not adequately
48. Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 2, at 102-03.
49. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 814 (rejecting argument that due process requires opt in procedure in favor
of "the obvious advantages in judicial efficiency resulting from the 'opt out' approach"); Guthrie v. Evans,
815 F.2d 626, 629 (11th Cir. 1987) ("A fundamental purpose of the class action is to render manageable
litigation that involves numerous members of a homogenous class, who would all otherwise have access
to the court through individual lawsuits."); 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1751, at 8 (1986). But see Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 628 (opting out allows those dissatisfied
with the class device early exit, thus reducing appeals). Also, given the right to intervene through counsel
provided for in Rule 23(c)(2)(C), whether a class suit featuring many attorneys representing many more
concerned class members would actually prove less of a drain on judicial resources than a number of more
harmonious although discrete suits brought simultaneously is at least a fair question.
50. Settlement is widely recognized as an efficient method of dispute resolution, both because much
of the work is done by the parties, who know their interests better than a court, and because the pendency
of the action is of shorter duration than it would be if the case went to trial. Mashburn v. National
Healthcare, 684 F. Supp. 660, 669 (M.D. Ala. 1988) ("The law is clear that early settlements are to be
encouraged."); In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 63 F.R.D. at 429 ('It has long been recognized that
the courts favor the settlement of controversies.").
51. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812-13 (class actions only practical and economical way for aggrieved
parties to bring smaller claims); Simon, supra note 36, at 377 (complaining that Rule 23(b)(3) transmogrifies
federal judiciary "into a small claims courf ').
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represent his interests.52 This showing would require each opter out to demon-
strate that he is alleging some unique substantive legal issue or material fact,
or a unique way of presenting a substantive legal issue or material fact, that
the class suit will not fully and fairly address. The standard would allow opting
out if, for instance, a plaintiff alleging fraud argues that a different set of facts
led him to rely detrimentally on representations made by the defendant, or that
his position as a corporate employee established a legal relationship between
himself and the defendant distinguishable from that which obtained between
the defendant and the rest of the class. On the other hand, an individual would
not satisfy the heightened standard for exclusion if he were merely to claim that
he had been aggrieved to a greater financial extent than most or all of the
members of the class. The standard comprehends differences in kind but is
blind to differences in degree.
The definition of "good cause" under the proposed test is left vague, to be
filled in by courts with a view to ensuring that class members' interests are
adequately represented. 53 This vagueness should not be troubling. Other sec-
tions of the Federal Rules incorporate good cause requirements.54 Additionally,
an overly specific description of the proposed rule would be too rigid to stand
the test of time.55 Such flexibility is the advantage of the common law method,
which draws upon the lessons of experience to mediate between sterile rules
and the living facts of a particular case. Moreover, although the determination
of whether factual issues or legal claims are substantially different might be
difficult at times, courts already routinely make such judgments, both during
the pendency of class actions,56 and subsequent to them.
57
52. Accordingly, Rule 23(c)(2) might read: "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall
advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the member se-requests
shows good cause by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members
who do not request show good cause for exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request show good
cause for exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel."
53. Rule 23 already requires that named plaintiffs adequately represent the class. See supra note 2.
The good cause standard complements this requirement by identifying the representational concern as central
to the open access principle, and thus it attempts to define the limits of open access in the class action
context.
54. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (allowing time extensions "for cause shown"); FED. R. Civ. P.
30(b)(3) (modification of time for taking of deposition "for cause shown"); FED. R. CIrV. P. 35(a) (court
may order physical or medical examination only "for good cause shown"); FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c) (court
may set aside default judgment "for good cause shown").
55. Compare Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 2, at 103 (prediction that 23(b)(3)
class actions were "not appropriate" in mass tort cases) with Ratliff, supra note 35, at 65-68 (recent
developments favor use of mass tort class actions) and Note, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?:
Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461 (1988) and Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by
Collective Means, 62 IN. LJ. 561 (1987).
56. See, e.g., Davis Enters., Ltd. v. EPA, No. 87-5315, 1988 WL 91123, 4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 1988)
(individual suits filed by opters out are "similar to" the class action); Holland v. United States, No. 88-468,
1988 WL 71941, 2 (D.D.C. June 27, 1988) (claims raised by b(2) class members "are identical to those
raised" in class action).
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Even setting implementation problems aside, the good cause requirement
bears a heavy burden if it is to justify revision of the Federal Rules. The
modified rule must both sufficiently accommodate legitimately asserted open
access fights and, at the same time, weed out illegitimate manifestations of the
open access principle so as effectively to promote group litigation's equal
access ideal.
Unquestionably, the good cause requirement impinges to some undefined
extent on the open access principle in that it makes leaving a suit more difficult
than under the current statutory regime. However, several reasons suggest that
such a consequence should not be alarming. After all, limiting individual control
of a lawsuit does not completely eliminate such control. Important open access
rights, such as ensuring that one's factual situation and "theory of the case" are
heard in court, are preserved by the availability of systemic correctives which
allow the expression of individuality within the confines of the class structure.
Among these are the statutorily furnished opportunity to intervene through
counsel,58 and the possibility of court ordered subclassing on particular issues,
such as damages.59 More fundamentally, the good cause requirement still
allows putative class members with distinct claims to leave the suit. The
modified Rule denies self-exclusion only to class members with claims indistin-
guishable from those held by the class representatives. The modified Rule thus
relies on and imposes a normative judgment about the legitimate circumstances
in which opting out should be allowed. Note that Rule 23 already makes just
this sort of judgment in denying opt out rights across the board in b(l) and b(2)
57. See, e.g., Robinson v. Long Island R.R., No. 85-456, 1989 WL 140593, 3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15,
1989) (because b(2) class member could not "pursue a separate action that involves the same subject matter
against the same defendant" both during and after resolution of the class suit, "the courts have consistently
barred Capers class members from pursuing separate actions against the LIRR for racially motivated
employment discrimination"); DiLeo v. Baumhart, No. 84-7305, 1989 WL 39784,2 (dismissing subsequent
class action brought by opters out of first class action on grounds that second suit was based on "same
factual scenario").
58. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2)(C) ("any member... may... enter an appearance through counsel");
see Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628 (11th Cir. 1987) (refusing to hear appeal of unnamed class member
because he had not availed himself of intervention as "a means whereby class members can monitor the
representation of their rights"); Hoston v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650, 658 (E.D. La. 1975)
(notice in b(2) action must inform class members of their right to intervene under Rule 23(d)(2)). But see
DeGier v. McDonald's Corp., 76 F.R.D. 125, 127 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ("intervention still requires an absent
plaintiff class members [sic] to involve themselves in a law suit not of their own choosing").
59. See Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358,366 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Different members of the class may suffer different kinds of damages, but this is a reason to establish
subclasses ... rather than to increase the number of separate suits."); Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706
F.2d 1144, 1158 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[B]ifurcated procedure reflects a sensitivity toward the heterogeneous
quality of the claims resolved at the monetary relief stage."); Officers For Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
688 F.2d 615,634 (9th Cir. 1982) (bifurcating trials into separate liability and damages phases and tailoring
class certification appropriately); Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Grinnel Corp., 490 F.2d 1183, 1184 (2d Cir.
1974) (defining class for settlement purposes only); Mashburn v. National Healthcare, 684 F. Supp. 660,




actions.' Similarly, preclusion doctrines place off limits certain rationales that
a litigant might offer in support of a claim. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
impose constraints on a litigant's freedom to argue in her own behalf when the
substance of that argument has already been heard.61
Important individual interests are not threatened even in those situations in
which a class member has a distinct claim but finds the good cause standard
difficult to satisfy. To understand the practical effects of the good cause
requirement, two types of putative class members legitimately seeking to exit
a class suit-the legally sophisticated and the legally unsophisticated-must
be distinguished from each other. We have seen that litigants without access
to legal counsel, those litigants termed legally unsophisticated, opt out only
rarely and, when they do opt out, they quite possibly act in ignorance of the
consequences of their choice.62 Thus, for this group, the current regime fails
to ensure meaningful control over one's own litigation largely to the same
extent as would the good cause requirement. Under both the current and the
reformed rule these litigants would most likely not take the appropriate steps
necessary to perfect an individual claim.
Some class members with access to counsel and experience in the courts,
those termed legally sophisticated, also might well desire exclusion for legiti-
mate reasons and wish independently to arrive at decisions about when and
whom to sue. While anyone could appear before a court to show good cause
pro se, the gravity of the situation will in most instances require serious liti-
gants to obtain the assistance of counsel for the good cause hearing.63 The
disadvantage of the good cause requirement seems to be that it imposes a novel
financial burden on class members legitimately requesting exclusion. The
Supreme Court, in Shutts, observed a simple but subtle practical reality that
renders this concern with cost insignificant: "If ... the plaintiff's claim is
sufficiently large or important that he wishes to litigate it on his own, he will
60. Rule 23(d)(2), which is a "general statement of the equitable powers" of a federal district judge
presiding over a class action suit, 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 2, § 1793, at 294
(1986), arguably vests standardless discretion to allow opting out to b(l) and b(2) class members, id. § 1793,
at 311 ("court may send notice authorizing class members to opt-out in a Rule 23(b)(2) action"). Most often,
however, courts refuse to permit opting out of b(l) and b(2) classes. See, e.g., Nottingham Partners v. Trans-
Lux Corp., No. 88-0591, 1990 WL 93513, 3 (D. Mass. June 27, 1990) (denying (b)(2) class members opt
out privilege); Bandala v. Armstrong-Blum Mfg. Co., No. 87-5923, 1988 WL 2771, 3-4 (N.D. ILl. Jan. 12,
1988) (same). Resistance to allowing opting out except where absolutely necessary is also reflected in district
courts' systematic preference for certifying classes pursuant to b(1) and b(2) rather than to b(3), see supra
note 19.
61. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 (1985) (Preclusion "give[s] recognition to the
fact that the purpose of a lawsuit is not only to do substantial justice but to bring an end to controversy.
This is true... so that the moral force of court judgments will not be undermined."); 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (positing varied justifications in favor
of preclusion rules).
62. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
63. See In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 493 F.2d 1288, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 1974) (selecting
"reasonable indication of a desire to opt out" standard because "it certainly would be an undue burden on
class members to require them to retain counsel and prepare a formal legal document").
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likely have retained an attorney or have thought about filing suit."' Only
litigants already prepared to bear the cost of an attorney for the prosecution of
a separate action will incur the margin of additional cost generated by the good
cause showing.
Having demonstrated that the good cause requirement frustrates the open
access principle only minimally, it is important to understand how the good
cause requirement affirmatively promotes the equal access principle. By trans-
forming opting out into a representational device, the reformed rule benefits
the impoverished, ignorant,65 or absent66 litigant with a valid individual
claim, but who has difficulty asserting his distinct interest. Litigants who, with
the aid of counsel, do elect to come forward and opt out will stand as represen-
tatives for those who cannot enlist legal assistance and are incapable pro se.
Properly treated, opters out making the good cause showing will make "helpful
suggestion[s]" about the definition of the class itself.67 If cause is shown the
court could choose either to define a subclass with respect to certain issues or
simply to hold that the trial court should never have included litigants of certain
types in the class in the first place.68 Opting out becomes a judicial ocular,
which a judge may use to penetrate the opacity of class composition. As such,
it promotes a central concern of individualism, namely equal court access for
vindication of legal rights.
Additionally, the good cause requirement supports the equal access principle
by reducing incentives for strategic opting out and filing of multiple suits
turning on identical issues. If all who share the same claim must litigate it at
the same time in the same action, there can be no racing to the court against
the class. Nor can there be any sideline sitting. If the certifying court defines
the class with sufficient accuracy and scope, all those putative class members
64. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813 (emphasis added). The Court went on to observe that the opt out provision
should not be tailored to "the somewhat rare species of class member" holding an independently justiciable
claim but who is "unwilling to execute an 'opt out' form." Id. at 813-14. Although the Court in Shutts was
explaining why an opt out procedure need not be replaced by an opt in procedure, once the central
observation-that many class members with substantial, individually discrete claims will have already
retained counsel-is accepted, the logic applies with equal force to the "rara avis" who does not choose
representation by counsel at the good cause hearing. See also Coffee, supra note 28, at 904-06 (only those
with "independently marketable" claims will opt out).
65. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
66. Even in b(3) suits, in which individual notice is required, not all class members actually receive
notice. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950) ("[I]n the case of
persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification
... creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.") (decided before 1966 amend-
ments); Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, supra note 27, at 1146 (individual notice
sent by class representatives is not actually received by some class members).
67. Mashburn v. National Healthcare, 684 R Supp. 660, 672 (M.D. Ala. 1988). The Mashburn court
used objections raised by some class members at a settlement conference as indicia of objections which
might be raised by other absent class members. Id. at 679.
68. Id. at 673; see also Kaplan, supra note 5, at 396 (courts should consider dissenters who intervene
under Rule 23(c)(2)(C) representatives of absent class members); Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action:
ArdEmpirical Study, supra note 27, at 1141 (at commencement of class suit attorneys define class in vague
terms, a problem made more acute by ethical canons proscribing solicitation of clients).
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sitting out the suit will by defimtion be allowed to assert issues of law or fact
distinct from those being adjudged in the class action; they can take nothing
of value from even the most favorable resolution of the class suit. Similarly,
because class members have no incentive to opt out and then wait on the
sidelines, defendants need not fear the initiation of hundreds or thousands of
duplicative, independent suits and the subsequent stream of payments implied
by the ParkIane doctrine. Additionally, the absolute number of suits actually
filed on the same legal and factual issues will decline, as the opt out provision
consolidates substantially similar claims. This is so because, having greater
certainty about the total amount of damages and the fact that there will be
fewer suits, defendants should have increased confidence in the efficacy of
settlement. To the extent that the good cause requirement reduces the incentives
for destructive intraclass or class/mdividual rivalry, it promotes the equal access
principle for class members who choose to remain in the suit, as it ensures that
they will have "their own day in court."
Having a day in court means that justiciable claims will be given a timely
and complete hearing in a competent forum, not perfunctory dismissal demand-
ed by scarce judicial resources. More settlements and fewer filings free courts
from the expense of hearing duplicative litigation. Judges may consequently
devote more attention to discrete substantive claims. In this attenuated way,
court frugality is encouraged not for its own sake, but as an instrumental good,
making court access for valid claims not only available, but also meaningful.
Objectors will point to the irony of claiming to reduce costs through the
creation of another hearing procedure, a reform that seems, on its face, to
consume more judicial resources than an unregulated, wholly elective opt out
mechanism. However, the conservation of judicial resources through the
abolition of duplicative litigation, from filing through discovery and trial, may
easily be expected to outweigh the cost of even a great many exclusion hear-
ings."
Once the role of unconstrained individualism in the class action context is
properly confined to those instances in which the opter out holds a claim
69. Three other points support the cast-saving argument. First, the current opt out procedure, which
is ostensibly simple and thus encourages pro se filing, is not completely free of administrative costs. See,
e.g., Valente v. Pepsico, 89 F.R.D. 352 (D. Del. 1981) (considering validity of misfiled opt out and claim
forms); Perry v. Beneficial Fin. Co. 88 F.R.D. 221 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (considering validity of opt out requests
filed by class members acting pro se). Second, creating a new procedure to save resources over the long
term is a well accepted practice. One such example is the argument persuasively used by the Supreme Court
in Parklane to relax the mutuality-of-estoppel doctrine. There, the Court established the functional equivalent
of a good cause showing that would have to be applied in each case, but that over time was likely to reduce
the enormous costs associated with duplicative trials. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33
(1979). Third, one would expect the costs associated with a good cause showing to decrease over time in
absolute terms since future litigants will draw on common law interpretations of the Rule's language to
govern their conduct. The litigation cost curve will be steepest just after the good cause requirement is
adopted. Of course, similar costs in testing the limits of this new rule could be expected to accompany any
rule change whatsoever, simply because it is a new presence on the legal landscape which both judges and
litigants must assimilate.
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distinct from that of the class representative, the Federal Rules should tolerate
opting out for cause in b(1) and b(2) actions. Recall that currently the Federal
Rules presuppose that in b(1) and b(2) classes any one class member will
adequately represent another because their interests are the same. They form
a "cohesive" class and therefore the Rules deny any opportunity to leave a class
suit.70 The project of this Note, although principally examining b(3) suits, has
been to question just that sort of presumption. Similar analysis should, and
does, apply to b(l) and b(2) classes. Concededly, if cohesiveness means that
the interests of all b(1) and b(2) class members are identical, then there is no
practical reason to afford them opt out privileges; opting out in such cases
simply encourages relitigation of the same issues. Surely, however, all b(l) and
b(2) class litigants cannot possess identical claims in the strongest sense of the
word. One justification for the very existence of b(l) and b(2) class suits is that
those plaintiffs might independently pursue at least nominally different, and
possibly inconsistent, claims and remedies.7' Consolidation into a class action
is possible and desirable because the claims are more similar than different, but
they are not necessarily identical.72 Affording b(l) and b(2) class members
the chance to opt out would allow them to advance these often important,73
distinct claims.74
An additional fear assuaged by the denial of opt out privileges in both b(l)
and b(2) actions is that multiple suits will yield "inconsistent standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class."' This certainly militates against
70. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 3 19-20 ("The individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with
that of a class .... Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely
to safeguard the interests of all."); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 2.
72. This similarity component is most easily seen in the b(3) requirement that claims of the class
"predominate" over individual claims. Even in b(l) and b(2) suits, the prerequisite is that questions of law
or fact be "common" to the class and that the claims of the named class plaintiffs be "typical" of those of
the class as a whole. The language of b(l) and b(2) is couched in terms such as "grounds generally
applicable to the class" and nowhere mentions the more rigorous requirement that factual situations and
legal claims of all class members be identical. See, e.g., Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910, 918-19
(D.NJ. 1986) ("This prerequisite [commonality] requires only that there be some questions of law or fact
common to the class. It is not necessary that all the factual or legal issues raised by the case concern each
class member." (emphasis in original)).
73. See Schuwerk, Future Class Actions, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 63, 134-35 (1987) (questioning wisdom
of system which lends greater protection to property interests than to liberty interests often implicated in
b(l) and b(2) suits).
74. One might be tempted to resolve this difficulty by observing that a plaintiff with a distinct claim
would not be precluded in a future action subsequent to the class litigation because preclusion only applies
where the claims are identical The rules of merger and bar, however, dictate that a plaintiff must present
every issue supportive of her claim in a single action or not raise them at all. See RESTATEdENT (SECOND)
OFJtDGZMENTs §§ 18, 19,24 (1982). If the class loses on aparticular claim for failure to raise certain issues,
the harm to the individual plaintiff who would have raised those issues is obvious. Even when the class
wins, however, if relief is not adequate for an individual class member, she could find herself barred from
initiating a second case to perfect that relief. Precise definitions of "claims" and "issues" are elusive and
the subject of much controversy. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 2, at §§ 4402-4403,
4406-4407. This indeterminacy might encourage a putative class member, whose nominally independent
claim might be precluded in future litigation, legitimately to seek exclusion.
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
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unregulated opting out, where two or more litigants might present exactly the
same claim in independent actions. But, as we have seen dramatically in the
b(3) context, the solution to this problem is regulation-constraint-not prohibi-
tion. Application of a good cause test will place off-limits certain parasitic and
destructive reasons for a litigant's conduct. At the same time, an individual
legitimately petitioning for exclusion will serve not only her own interests; she
will also inform the court that a judge's initial certification of the class may
have been overbroad or unsophisticated, and thus will help make meaningful
the important individual rights our system most assiduously endeavors to
support.
CONCLUSION: THE INDIVIDUALIST LEGACY AND GROUP LmGATION
To say that opting out protects individual rights against tyrannical group
litigation practices grossly oversimplifies the complex interests involved in the
modem class action. Properly characterized, individualist concerns pervade the
class suit and are experienced in different but important ways by both opters
out and those people satisfied with class membership.
Putative class members have no legitimate interest in pursuing the practice
of unregulated opting out. The reformulated opt out rule proposed in this Note
more closely ties the seemingly anomalous opt out provision currently in force
to the equal access principle at the core of group litigation. The good cause
requirement does not impinge upon individual rights so much as it defines the
scope of competing individualist ideals within the class action context. Concep-
tualized in this way, individualism and group litigation need not be locked in
a continual battle for supremacy; rather, they are mutually vital components of
a system which seeks to vindicate rights contemporaneously enjoyed by many.
1990]

